CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/235
26 August 1968
Original: ENGLISH

BRAZIL, BURMA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic continue to view with deep concern that it has not so far been possible to reach agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They had expressed their apprehensions and anxieties in this regard in their earlier joint memoranda (ENDC/159 and ENDC/177).

Ever since 1959, when the General Assembly of the United Nations became seized of this question, it has adopted Resolutions each year on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

In its latest Resolution on the subject, 2343 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, the General Assembly has urged all States which have not so far adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to do so without further delay, and has called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and has expressed the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data. Finally, the resolution has requested the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session.

In the Preamble of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 the three nuclear-weapon powers parties to the Treaty had expressed their determination "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

It is a matter of utmost regret that despite the General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVI), which had condemned all nuclear weapon tests, and the Partial Test Ban Treaty, nuclear weapon tests have not been suspended but are continuing both in atmosphere and underground.

GE.68-16209
68-18626

The eight delegations are gravely concerned by the fact that all countries have not yet adhered to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Tests in the atmosphere are, in fact, taking place at an increasing rate and the yields of such tests have reached the megaton range, resulting once again in widespread radioactive contamination, which had started diminishing since the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

Nuclear weapon testing underground is also continuing at a high frequency and with increasing yields, thus substantiating the fears expressed in the Memorandum of the eight delegations of August 17, 1966, that continued testing would impart "a renewed impetus to the arms race, bringing about unforeseeable consequences in regard to imbalance and mistrust in the relationship between States and causing immense and increasing diversion of human and material resources for purposes of war."

There have also been reports that large underground tests have led to leakages of radioactivity outside the territorial limits of testing States, thus causing infringements of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Even if these incidents have not been deliberate, they may eventually lead to a weakening of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and even endanger its very existence.

The heavy costs involved in nuclear weapon testing and the continued drain on highly specialized personnel being used for the further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons are a matter of serious concern for the international community. Considerable economic and technical resources and personnel could be redirected to peaceful scientific efforts and co-operation in the peaceful nuclear field if a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were concluded.

The eight delegations reaffirm their strong view that a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests would be an important step in the field of disarmament and would constitute an earnest of the intention of the nuclear-weapon Powers to carry out their obligations in accordance with the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

The eight delegations are aware that the differences among the nuclear-weapon Powers on the question of verification and the type of system needed for monitoring a treaty banning underground tests have not yet been resolved in spite of the fact that there has been considerable progress in regard to methods of control of an underground test ban.

The eight delegations note that various proposals have been put forward in the Committee by several delegations. They view with deep apprehension the fact that no serious negotiations have taken place on these proposals. These proposals should be studied further without delay.

Further international discussion could be held to promote an organized international exchange of seismic data from national seismological stations. Such an exchange would help to provide a better scientific basis for national evaluation of underground events.

An encouraging development has been that experts from various countries including four nuclear-weapon States have recently had an unofficial meeting in order to exchange views and hold discussions in regard to the adequacy of such methods. It is the view of the eight delegations that such discussions are useful and should continue.

In the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in connexion with discussions on it the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has been given considerable prominence. This question is, however, also closely linked with a comprehensive test ban. This aspect of the matter underlines the urgency of a universal and comprehensive solution of the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the context of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The eight delegations strongly urge that renewed and urgent efforts be made to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the eight delegations reaffirm their strong and consistent view that the nuclear-weapon States should take immediate steps for the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests.

Geneva, August 26, 1968

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/236
28 August 1968
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

REPORT

TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AND THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submits to the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission a report on the Committee's deliberations on the questions before it for the period 16 July 1968 to 28 August 1968.

Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America.

Upon the recommendation of the Co-Chairmen, members of the Committee reconvened the Conference on 16 July 1968.

Fourteen formal plenary meetings took place between 16 July 1968 and 28 August 1968. On 8 August, 1968, the Committee held an informal plenary meeting.

I. Resolutions of the General Assembly referred to the Committee

The Committee had before it Resolution 2289 (XXII), "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons"; Resolution 2342A (XXII) and 2342B (XXII), "Question of general and complete disarmament"; Resolution 2343 (XXII), "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests"; Resolution 2344 (XXII), "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America"; and Resolution 2373 (XXII), "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

The Committee considered these resolutions. Noting the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 2373, the Committee devoted most of its attention to the request of the General Assembly that the Committee urgently pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

68-18629
GE.68-15466

II. Messages, Working Papers and Other Documents submitted to the Conference

On 11 January 1968 and 20 June 1968, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Co-Chairmen letters containing the above resolutions of the General Assembly.(ENDC 210 and 226)*

On 16 July 1968, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a "Memorandum by the Government of the USSR on Some Urgent Measures for Stopping the Arms Race and for Disarmament". (ENDC 227)*

On 16 July 1968, the representative of the United States of America submitted a message to the Conference from President Johnson. (ENDC 228)*

On 16 July 1968, the representative of the United Kingdom submitted a message to the Conference from Prime Minister Wilson. (ENDC 229)*

On 29 July 1968, the representative of Sweden submitted a letter which enclosed a summary report of the meetings of a group of experts on seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions convened by the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm (SIPRI). (ENDC 230)*

On 6 August 1968, the representative of the United Kingdom submitted a Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare. (ENDC 231)*

On 20 August 1968, the representative of the United Kingdom submitted a Working Paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (ENDC 232)*

On 23 August 1968, the representative of Italy submitted a Working Paper on Underground Nuclear Explosions. (ENDC 234)*

On 26 August 1968, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic submitted a Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (ENDC 235)*

Transmitted as Annex II to this Report is a list of all documents submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee and verbatim records of the plenary meetings. Annex I contains the text of attached documents.

III. Agenda

In recognition of the views expressed by the members of the Committee, in response to the recommendations of the General Assembly, taking into account the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also the agreement announced on 1 July 1968, for bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles, which was welcomed by members of the Committee, the Co-Chairmen recommended the following provisional agenda which was adopted by the Committee on 15 August 1968:

---

* Indicates Conference documents which are attached to Annex I.

"1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

"Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons, and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear free zones, etc.

"2. Non-nuclear measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.

"3. Other collateral measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the seabed, etc.

"4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The Committee also noted the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject at any time.

Because of the comparative shortness of this session, the Committee reports that it has not been able to give comprehensive consideration to the matters before it. However, the Committee had a useful discussion of items on the agenda. All delegations participated in the work of the Committee and many interesting suggestions were made.

The Committee believes that the adoption of this agenda is a step forward which will facilitate progress in its work. In addition, the submission and discussion of concrete proposals, the exchange of views, and the exploration of possible questions which may become ripe for agreement, all help to lay the foundation for fruitful negotiations in the future.

IV. Questions Considered by the Committee

A. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

The Committee agreed that first priority in its work should be given to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. In this session, and pursuant to the recommendations of the General Assembly in Resolution 2373 (XXII), the Committee pursued negotiations on such measures. Several delegations made useful contributions.

In accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly in Resolution 2343 (XXII), the Committee gave consideration to the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. The Committee held a useful and valuable discussion regarding this important matter.

Pursuant to Resolution 2289 (XXII), the Committee received from the Secretary-General the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the records of the First Committee concerning such a convention. Members of the Committee had an extensive discussion of this matter.

The Committee considered the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles. Members of the Committee also took up the subject of nuclear free zones.

The Committee intends to devote attention to this category of measures commensurate with the priority attached to it by the agenda. The hope was expressed that one or more of the measures within this category would become ripe for agreement at an early date.

B. Non-Nuclear Measures

Taking into account Resolution 2162B (XXI) of the General Assembly, the Committee considered the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The United Kingdom proposed a study by the Secretary General on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use. Poland proposed a study by the Secretary-General on the effects of the use of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Committee agreed to recommend to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. Because of the importance of this matter, the hope was expressed that the report on this study would be referred at an early date to the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Committee. A number of other proposals were also made concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons.

Members of the Committee expressed the view that the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons should be given further attention in its next session.

Views were also expressed on the problem of regional arms limitations.

C. Other collateral measures

Several suggestions were made concerning the problem of prevention of an arms race on the seabed. The Committee concluded that this new subject would be a fruitful area for its future work.

Taking into account Resolution 2344 (XXII), delegations made statements on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases.

D. General and complete disarmament

In accordance with General Assembly Resolutions 2342A and B (XXII) and 2373 (XXII), and taking into account the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons (A/6858), members of the Committee exchanged views on the question of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and emphasized the importance of resuming the consideration of this question.

V. Meetings of the Co-Chairmen

During the period covered by this report, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, held meetings to discuss the schedule of and procedure for the work of the Committee and also certain substantive questions before the Committee.

* * *

The Committee agreed to reconvene on a date to be established by the Co-Chairmen in consultation with all members of the Committee.

This report is transmitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

_____

United States of America

_____

ANNEX I

List of documents attached to the Report

Letter dated 11 January 1968 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament Transmitting Resolutions 2286 (XXII), 2289 (XXII), 2342 (XXII), 2343 (XXII), 2344 (XXII) and 2346 (XXII) of the General Assembly.	ENDC/210
Letter dated 20 June 1968 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament Transmitting Resolution 2373 (XXII) of the General Assembly and Resolution S/RES/255 of the Security Council.	ENDC/226*
Memorandum by the Government of the USSR on some Urgent Measures for Stopping the Arms Race and for Disarmament.	ENDC/227
United States of America: Message of President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.	ENDC/228
United Kingdom: Message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, The Right Honourable Harold Wilson, M.P.	ENDC/229
Sweden: Letter dated 29 July 1968 from the Representative of Sweden to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	ENDC/230
United Kingdom: Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare.	ENDC/231*
United Kingdom: Working Paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	ENDC/232
Italy: Working Paper on Underground Nuclear Explosions	ENDC/234
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic: Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.	ENDC/235

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/210
18 January 1968

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JANUARY 1968 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING RESOLUTIONS 2286 (XXII), 2289 (XXII), 2342 (XXII), 2343 (XXII) 2344 (XXII) AND 2346 (XXII) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I have the honour to transmit the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

A/RES/2289 (XXII) - "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1623rd meeting on 8 December 1967;

A/RES/2342A (XXII) and A/RES/2342B (XXII) - "Question of general and complete disarmament", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967;

A/RES/2343 (XXII) - "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967;

A/RES/2344 (XXII) - "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967;

A/RES/2346A (XXII) - "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967.

I would draw attention particularly to the following direct references to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament contained in the above-mentioned resolutions:

In A/RES/2289 (XXII), operative paragraph 2 referring to the possibility of negotiations by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the conclusion of an appropriate convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons;

In A/RES/2342A (XXII), operative paragraph 4 recommending that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, should take into account the Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons and the conclusions thereof (A/6858);

In A/RES/2342B (XXII), operative paragraphs 1 and 3 requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with resolution 2162C (XXI) and to report on the progress achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In A/RES/2343 (XXII), operative paragraph 4 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In A/RES/2344 (XXII), operative paragraphs 1 and 2 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in accordance with resolution 2165 (XXI), and to report on the progress achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In A/RES/2346A (XXII), operative paragraphs 2 and 3 calling upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue negotiations on a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee as well as the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, and requesting the Committee to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations together with pertinent documents and records.

In connexion with paragraph 3 of A/RES/2289 (XXII), the relevant documents and records are the following:

A/6834; A/6840/Add.1; A/6850/Rev.1; A/6851/Rev.1
A/C.1/L.409; A/C.1/PV.1532, 1534-1537, 1539-1541
A/6945; A/PV.1623

In connexion with paragraph 2 of A/RES/2342B (XXII), the relevant documents and records are the following:

A/6680/Rev.1; A/6840; A/6850/Rev.2; A/6851/Rev.2
A/C.1/L.411; A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1; A/C.1/L.412 and Add. 1-2;
A/C.1/L.415; A/C.1/L.417; A/C.1/L.419 and Add. 1-2
A/C.1/PV.1545-1555; A/7017; A/PV.1640

I also have the honour to transmit herewith, for information of the members of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, which deal with disarmament matters:

A/RES/2286 (XXII) - "Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America", adopted at the 1620th meeting on 5 December 1967;

A/RES/2346B (XXII) - "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

U Thant
Secretary-General

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2289 (XXII)
11 December 1967

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 96

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/6945)]

2289 (XXII). Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, contained in resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,

Reaffirming its conviction, expressed in resolution 2164 (XXI) of 5 December 1966, that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give further impetus to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament,

Considering that it is necessary, in view of the present international situation, to make new efforts aimed at expediting the solution of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons,

1. Expresses its conviction that it is essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention;

2. Urges all States, in this connexion, to examine in the light of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI) the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics[1] and such other proposals as may be made on this question and to

---

1/ See A/6834.

/...

undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the records of the meetings of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" to all States Members of the United Nations and to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

1623rd plenary meeting,
8 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2342 (XXII)
4 January 1968

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 29

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7017)]

2342 (XXII). Question of general and complete disarmament

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966, in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons,

Noting that the report has been completed and is available,[1]

Convinced that the wide dissemination of the report would contribute to a better understanding of the threat presented by nuclear weapons and encourage speedy progress in the prevention of their spread, as well as in other measures of nuclear disarmament,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the Secretary-General's report as an authoritative statement on the effects of nuclear weapons and on the implications of their acquisition and further development;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the report was prepared;

3. Notes the conclusions of the report and expresses the hope that all the parties concerned will consider them carefully;

1/ A/6858.

/...

4. Recommends that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should take into account the report and the conclusions thereof in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the full report as a United Nations publication and, making full use of all the facilities of the United Nations Office of Public Information, to publicize the report in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;

6. Recommends to all Governments the wide distribution of the report and its publication in their respective languages, as appropriate, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;

7. Invites regional intergovernmental organizations, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and national and international non-governmental organizations to use all the facilities available to them to make the report widely known.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

B

The General Assembly,

Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,1/

Recalling its resolutions 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965 and 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

Noting that since then the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament,

Reaffirming its conviction of the necessity to continue to exert new efforts, for the purpose of ensuring tangible progress towards the achievement of an agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament,

---

1/ A/6951.

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI);

2. Decides to transmit to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all the documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee, as well as those of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly pertaining to this item;

3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress achieved on the question of general and complete disarmament to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2343 (XXII)
4 January 1968

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 30

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7021)]

2343 (XXII). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,[1]

Recalling its resolutions 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965 and 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

Noting with regret the fact that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,[2]

Noting with increasing concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

Taking into account the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, an exchange of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for national evaluation of seismic events,

Recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests,

---

1/ A/6951.

2/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

/...

Realizing that such a treaty would also constitute an effective measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. Urges all States which have not done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;

2. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

3. Expresses the hope that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data;

4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2344 (XXII)
4 January 1968

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 31

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7022)]

2344 (XXII). Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America

The General Assembly,

Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,[1]

Recalling its resolution 2165 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to give sufficient consideration to the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America,

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI);

2. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on the progress achieved on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

1640th plenary meeting
19 December 1967.

1/ A/6951.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2346 (XXII)
5 January 1968

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 28

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7016)]

2346 (XXII). Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

A

The General Assembly,

Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,[1]

Noting the progress that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has made towards preparing a draft international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Noting further that it has not been possible to complete the text of an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that it is imperative to make further efforts to conclude such a treaty at the earliest possible date,

Expressing the hope that the remaining differences between all the States concerned can be quickly resolved,

Taking into account the fact that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and intends to submit a full report for the consideration of the General Assembly as soon as possible,

---

1/ A/6951.

/...

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, 2149 (XXI) of 4 November 1966 and 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966;

2. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue its work, giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee and to the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;

3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with the pertinent documents and records;

4. Recommends that upon the receipt of that report appropriate consultations should be initiated, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, on the setting of an early date after 15 March 1968 for the resumption of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly to consider item 28 (a) entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament".

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966, by which it decided that a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States should be convened not later than July 1968,

Having considered with appreciation the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,[1/]

1. Approves the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, subject to paragraph 2 below;

2. Decides to convene the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968;

1/ A/6817.

3. Decides to invite to the Conference non-nuclear-weapon States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to make appropriate arrangements for convening the Conference in accordance with the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED
A/RES/2286 (XXII)
8 December 1967

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 91

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/6921)]

2286 (XXII). Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 it expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would carry out studies and take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Recalling also that in the same resolution it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and particularly the nuclear Powers, would lend it their full co-operation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims,

Considering that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-and non-nuclear Powers,

Bearing in mind that in its resolution 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966 it expressly called upon all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which might conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Noting that that is precisely the object of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, by twenty-one

/ ...

Latin American States, which are convinced that the Treaty will constitute a measure that will spare their peoples the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, that it will be a stimulus to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the promotion of economic and social development and that it will act as a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament,

Noting that it is the intent of the signatory States that all existing States within the zone defined in the Treaty may become parties to the Treaty without any restriction,

Taking note of the fact that the Treaty contains two additional protocols open, respectively, to the signature of States which, de jure or de facto, are internationally responsible for territories which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty, and to the signature of States possessing nuclear weapons, and convinced that the co-operation of such States is necessary for the greater effectiveness of the Treaty,

1. Welcomes with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples;

2. Calls upon all States to give their full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoys the universal observance to which its lofty principles and noble aims entitle it;

3. Recommends States which are or may become signatories of the Treaty and those contemplated in Additional Protocol I of the Treaty to strive to take all the measures within their power to ensure that the Treaty speedily obtains the widest possible application among them;

4. Invites Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible.

1620th plenary meeting,
5 December 1967.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/226 *
16 July 1968

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 JUNE 1968 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING RESOLUTION 2373(XXII) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND RESOLUTION S/RES/255 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

.... I have the honour to transmit herewith resolution 2373(XXII) of 12 June 1968, adopted by the General Assembly on agenda item 28 (a) of the twenty-second session entitled, "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament". Annexed to the resolution is the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I wish to draw attention, in particular, to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution, requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and requesting furthermore the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

All the relevant documents and records relating to the discussion of item 28 (a) in the First Committee and in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly have been circulated to the Members of the United Nations, including all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

.... I also have the honour to transmit herewith resolution S/RES/255 (1968), adopted by the Security Council at its 1433rd meeting on 19 June 1968, dealing with the question of appropriate measures to be undertaken to safeguard the security of States in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(Signed) U Thant
Secretary-General

---

* For technical reasons this document is reissued and replaces ENDC/226 issued on 20 June 1968.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2373(XXII)
18 June 1968

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 28 (a)

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7016/Add.1)]

2373 (XXII). Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2346 A (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966, 2149 (XXI) of 4 November 1966, 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, and 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961,

Convinced of the urgency and great importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and of intensifying international co-operation in the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, dated 14 March 1968,[1] and appreciative of the work of the Committee on the elaboration of the draft non-proliferation treaty, which is attached to that report,[2]

Convinced that, pursuant to the provisions of the treaty, all signatories have the right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and will be able to acquire source and special fissionable materials, as well as equipment for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes,

Convinced further that an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim,

---

1/ A/7072

2/ Ibid., annex I.

Affirming that in the interest of international peace and security both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States carry the responsibility of acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations that the sovereign equality of all States shall be respected, that the threat or use of force in international relations shall be refrained from and that international disputes shall be settled by peaceful means,

1. Commends the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;

2. Requests the Depositary Governments to open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;

3. Expresses the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States;

4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

5. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

1672nd plenary meeting,
12 June 1968.

ANNEX

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purpose of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this _____ day of _____.

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/255 (1968)
19 June 1968

RESOLUTION 255 (1968)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1433rd meeting
on 19 June 1968

The Security Council,

Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,

1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;

2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/227
16 July 1968
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

MEMORANDUM BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR ON SOME URGENT MEASURES FOR STOPPING THE ARMS RACE AND FOR DISARMAMENT

Since the very first days of its existence, the Soviet State has based its foreign policy on the struggle against the imperialist policy of aggression and war, the struggle to secure peace among the nations. Following the course mapped out by V.I. Lenin, the Soviet Government has perseveringly and consistently come out in favour of implementing a broad programme of measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament, in favour of translating into reality a plan of general and complete disarmament.

The active efforts of socialist countries, and of all peace-loving States, have resulted in a series of practical steps aimed at limiting the scope of the nuclear arms race and achieving disarmament. The Moscow Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was followed by the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in Outer Space, which blocked the way to outer space for nuclear weapons. Now drafted and ready for signature is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is of great importance for strengthening peace and creating favourable conditions for further efforts to stop the arms race and to implement effective measures for banning and destroying nuclear weapons.

The interests of safeguarding peace demand further steps to restrict the arms race and to achieve disarmament. This is the more important since, as a result of the intensified activities of aggressive circles, international tension has increased, the aggressive war waged by the United States in Viet-nam is growing in scope and the occupation by Israel of the territories, seized by force, of a number of Arab States continues.

After the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that agreement should be reached to implement in the very near future the following urgent measures aimed at stopping the nuclear arms race and achieving disarmament.

1. Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

Since the emergence of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated the prohibition and complete destruction of these weapons of mass annihilation. The conclusion of an international agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step towards the solution of this problem and towards the removal of the threat

of nuclear war. Such an agreement would be a serious deterrent to all those who might wish to resort to nuclear weapons. By allaying the apprehensions of some States as to the intentions of others regarding the use of nuclear weapons, such an agreement would be conducive to the establishment of a healthy international atmosphere.

To facilitate a speedy solution of this problem, the Government of the USSR proposed for the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-second session a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. A significant majority of the delegations at the Assembly concurred with the idea of the need for such an international convention. The Assembly called upon all States to examine the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Soviet Union as well as such other proposals as might be made on this question, and to conduct negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention either through the convening of an international conference, or in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States.

With a view to obtaining a practical solution of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament discuss as a matter of high priority the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of such weapons and exchange opinions on the convening of an international conference to sign an appropriate convention.

2. Measures for stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons and for reducing and destroying stockpiles

Desiring to deliver mankind from the danger of nuclear war, the Soviet Government proposes that all nuclear Powers should forthwith enter into negotiations on stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and on the reduction of stockpiles, to be followed by the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control. The Soviet Government declares its readiness to start such negotiations with all other nuclear Powers at any time. In so doing, the Soviet Government considers that in the course of such negotiations agreement may be achieved both on the whole package of measures leading to the destruction of nuclear weapons and on some of the measures designed to achieve that aim.

3. Limitation and subsequent reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons

The Soviet Government proposes that agreement should be reached on definite steps for the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government considers that the destruction of the whole arsenal of

strategic means of delivery, or at any rate the reduction of that arsenal to an absolute minimum, leaving -- and that only temporarily -- not more than a strictly limited quantity of such means of delivery, would be a measure conducive to the removal of the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Government declares its readiness to undertake an exchange of views with the States concerned on the mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

4. Prohibition of flights beyond national borders of bombers carrying nuclear weapons. Limitation of navigation zones for rocket-carrying submarines

The Soviet Government has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Governments of other States and of world public opinion to the danger inherent in the flights of bombers with nuclear weapons on board beyond national borders. The increased number of accidents involving United States bombers with nuclear weapons on board outside the territory of the United States is a matter of legitimate concern to various countries. There is no guarantee that the next accident to a bomber armed with nuclear bombs will not result in a nuclear explosion, with all the ensuing consequences. In the present state of tension, such a nuclear explosion may lead to a whole series of grave events, to a conflict dangerous for all mankind. From the military point of view, such flights of bombers, given the existence of rockets carrying nuclear warheads, are devoid of sense. They can have but one aim -- to increase international tension, regardless of the consequences of such a dangerous practice.

The Soviet Government proposes that flights beyond national borders of bombers with nuclear weapons on board should be banned without delay.

In order to reduce the risk of nuclear war, the Soviet Government also proposes that agreement should be reached to the effect that patrolling by submarines carrying nuclear missiles should be prohibited in areas from which the missiles can reach the frontiers of the contracting parties.

5. Ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests

The Soviet Union has been and continues to be a steadfast advocate of the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, believing that the banning of all tests will promote the consolidation of peace and the slackening of the arms race. The Soviet Government is prepared to reach agreement without delay on the banning of underground nuclear-weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection to control observance of the ban.

6. Prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons

The Soviet Government has on several occasions drawn the attention of States to the threat posed for mankind by the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Voicing the general concern of nations over such a threat, the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-first session adopted a resolution calling for strict observance by all States of the principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare, condemning all actions contrary to that objective and inviting all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol.

By some countries, however, chief among them the United States of America, this important decision of the General Assembly is not being carried out. What is more, the United States is using chemical weapons in its aggressive war in Viet-nam. The Soviet Government therefore proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider ways and means of securing the observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare.

7. Elimination of foreign military bases

Foreign military bases in the territories of other States are a serious danger to peace. Such bases are a source of military conflicts and a threat to the freedom and independence of peoples. This is convincingly proved by the continuing aggressive war of the United States in Viet-nam and by the tension and conflicts in other parts of the world where foreign bases are situated.

The Soviet Government proposes that, in accordance with the mandate given by the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-first session, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should give urgent consideration to the question of the elimination of foreign military bases.

8. Measures for regional disarmament

The Soviet Government is in favour of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. It is of the opinion that the creation of such zones should effectively limit the area of distribution of nuclear weapons and be fully consistent with the objective of preventing their direct or indirect proliferation.

The Soviet Government considers that not only groups of States embracing whole continents or large geographical areas but also more limited groups of States and even individual countries may assume obligations to establish denuclearized zones.

The Soviet Government also supports proposals concerning the implementation of measures for regional disarmament and for the reduction of armaments in various parts of the world, including the Middle East. The question of such measures to restrict the arms race in the Middle East could, of course, be considered only subject to the elimination of the consequences of the Israel aggression against Arab countries and, above all, subject to the complete withdrawal of Israel troops from the territories of Arab countries occupied by them.

9. Peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor

The interests of the restriction of the arms race are also served by the limitation of the military uses of the environments in which man lives and works and by the prevention of the extension of such uses to new spheres of human activity. The Soviet Government has consistently striven and is still striving towards the achievement of these goals, and it is gratified to note that important practical steps in this direction are to be found in the relevant limitations embodied in the Antartic Treaty and in the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

The progress of research and the prospects for the development of the sea-bed and the ocean floor make it possible to raise the question of giving timely expression in appropriate form, to a regime such as would ensure the utilization of the sea-bed beyond the limits of the present territorial waters solely for peaceful purposes. That would, in particular, involve the prohibition of the establishment of fixed military installations on the sea-bed, as well as other activities of a military nature. The Soviet Government proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should start negotiations on the question of the utilization exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed beyond the limits of the present territorial waters.

* *
*

In proposing the above measures, the Soviet Government draws attention to the need for making every effort to achieve concrete results in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to give a new impetus to the negotiations on this question in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. At the same time it is in favour of the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly's decision concerning the holding of a world disarmament conference, and it is

confident that the convening of such a conference will contribute to the solution of this most important problem confronting mankind.

Guided by its position of principle in questions concerning the struggle for peace, the Soviet Union, in co-operation with the socialist countries and with all peace-loving States, will work for removing the threat of nuclear war, for curbing the forces of aggression and for carrying out a broad programme of disarmament. The Soviet Government calls upon all States to do all that is necessary to achieve agreement on urgent measures for stopping the arms race, and on disarmament.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/228
16 July 1968
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Message of President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Your conference has achieved singular success in negotiating the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty is a major step toward a goal which the United States has been seeking since the dawn of the nuclear age. It is a triumph of sanity in international affairs and a testament to man's will to survive.

The world looks today for a beginning of the negotiations called for by the Treaty — "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...".

This is the most pressing task which the treaty lays on its parties, and the nations meeting in Geneva today share a major responsibility in performing it. The United States takes this responsibility with the utmost seriousness.

High on the disarmament agenda of mankind is the need to halt the strategic arms race. Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. It is expected that the two sides will shortly reach a decision on the time and place for talks.

In the absence of agreement, the nuclear arms race could escalate to new levels. This would only result in higher and higher destructive power on each side and vast diversion of resources from peaceful pursuits - with no increase in security for anyone.

If we can make progress on limiting strategic delivery systems, the United States would be prepared to consider reductions of existing systems. By reducing these systems, we would cut back effectively - and for the first time - on the vast potentials for destruction which each side possesses.

The United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to head off a strategic arms race. The fate of mankind could well depend on the manner in which our two nations discharge that responsibility.

Progress on limiting strategic delivery systems will also facilitate the achievement of various related measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament. A number of such measures has been suggested by the United States. Additional measures have been proposed by other nations and recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The United States hopes that your conference will soon be able to make significant progress on measures which have been the subject of past discussions. But these are not the only subjects of interest to the conference.

We must soon take up the question of arms limitations on the seabed in the light of the consideration being given by the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds to a number of proposals for arms limitations on the seabed. Your conference should begin to define those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction.

Meaning must soon be given to the language of the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealing with sharing potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. In the view of the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency is the "appropriate international body" through which the non-nuclear-weapon parties to the treaty may obtain these benefits under Article V of the Treaty if they choose to do so. We also believe that the IAEA is the appropriate forum for development of procedures and agreements relating to the furnishing of the peaceful nuclear explosive services obtained through the IAEA.

Finally, we must be alert to opportunities for achieving regional limitations on armaments. We have seen that co-operation at the regional level to limit armaments is not only possible but is in fact a promising path to progress. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a worthy example of what can be achieved when neighbours collaborate in safeguarding their national security interests and in promoting their common welfare. In signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States had demonstrated its intention to respect the denuclearized status of Latin America which will be established by that Treaty. We hope that all nuclear powers will respect this great achievement of Latin American diplomacy.

We have also seen the consequences of the failure of nations to effect regional arrangements to inhibit the growth of arsenals of conventional weapons. Resources continue to be diverted from critical human needs to the acquisition of armaments and the maintenance of military establishments that in themselves feed fears and create insecurity among nations.

The United States attaches particular importance to halting non-nuclear arms races. We must achieve regional limitations on conventional armaments.

Representatives of the United States are under standing instructions to search out any initiatives for regional restraints coming from the areas concerned. If arrangements acceptable to the nations involved can be concluded, they will be respected by the United States. We stand ready to support any reasonable measure affecting the activities of the major weapons-producers that would make a regional agreement more effective, including a requirement that suppliers publicize or register their arms shipments to a particular region.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/229
16 July 1968
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED KINGDOM

Message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, The Right Honourable Harold Wilson, M.P.

At its last session the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee's long and patient labours on the Non-Proliferation Treaty were finally crowned with success and with the opening of the Treaty for signature the Committee will be free to turn its attention to other measures of arms control and disarmament. This is a tremendous opportunity which must be exploited to the full. I am sure the Disarmament Committee will be equal to its responsibilities and trust that in its present session it will initiate work that will enable further steps to be taken on the long road that leads to general and complete disarmament.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/230
29 July 1968
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

Letter dated 29 July 1968 from the Representative of Sweden to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Enclosed with this letter you will find a copy of a press release issued by the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm on June 29, 1968, regarding two meetings of seismological experts which took place in Sweden in April and June of this year. Attached to the press release is a Summary Report, adopted by this group of experts on seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions.

The International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm (SIPRI) is a non-governmental international institution, which was set up two years ago through a decision of the Swedish Parliament which also allocates the main funds for its activities. The governing bodies and the personnel of the Institute are, however, international. The Swedish Government is thus not involved in or responsible for the actions or publications of the Institute.

As this documentation would seem to be of interest to other delegations in the ENDC I hereby request you to circulate this letter with the enclosed press release and Summary Report as an ENDC -document.

(signed) Alva Myrdal
Chairman of the Delegation

SIPRI
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH
Sveavägen 166, 113 46 Stockholm, Tel. 34 96 00

Press Release

Stockholm, June 29, 1968, at 2 p.m.

The group of seismological experts from 10 countries including four nuclear powers which met at Tällberg, Dalarna, last Monday adjourned yesterday after having unanimously adopted a joint report assessing today's state of the art of seismic test ban verification. The meeting was the second of two by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The plan is to publish the experts' report as soon as possible preferably before the resumption of the Geneva disarmament conference on July 16, in order to provide a technical background for those who have to make political judgements in different countries.

The main feature of the report is the recognition that it is now possible to distinguish large and medium-sized underground explosions from interfering earthquakes. This provides a new situation in test ban control. The report includes no political judgement of the sufficiency of available capabilities.

An assessment of the state of the art of seismic test ban control cannot alone indicate whether sufficient security can be achieved or not. But it is a necessary ingredient for political decision-making. Other ingredients are assessments of the security risks of cheating by the other parties if it is not disclosed, the need for additional measures as on-site-inspections, the military significance of difficult-to-disclose small tests, and the general feasibility of stopping all testing and by that restricting weapons development. This last point is closely related to procurement of ABM systems.

Seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions: An assessment of the Status and Outlook

Summary of Report of SIPRI Seismic Study Group, April and June 1968

Considerable progress in the field of detection and identification of underground explosions and earthquakes has been made since 1960, when technical talks

were held on this subject in Geneva. At that time the prospect of identification of explosions as such was considered remote. On the initiative of SIPRI an expert study group was convened to review and assess the present possibilities of detection and identification by seismological means alone of underground explosions and earthquakes. In the work of the group, seismologists from the following ten countries took part:

Canada
Czechoslovakia
France
India
Japan
Rumania
Sweden
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States of America

The study group considered these developments in order to assess the state of the art in different countries, to find areas of consensus, to probe unclear or controversial areas and to point out promising areas for further research and development. One of the main tasks of the group was to examine the usefulness of networks for the detection and identification by seismological means only of underground explosions. The members of the study group presented the most recent results and arrived at the conclusions summarized below.

(1) Since 1960 improvements in the fields of instrumentation, seismological theory and interpretation of observations have been achieved, and networks of standardized instruments (reporting to data centres, for example the I.S.C. at Edinburgh and B.C.I.S. at Strasbourg) have been deployed. Research and development of this type had been recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts. This and other encouragement to research has led to the establishment of several seismological networks and stations. Two of them are particularly large and homogeneous, one consisting of about 100 widespread single stations. One of these systems is the national system deployed on the territory of the USSR. The other, the so-called WWSSN (World Wide Standard Seismological Network) system, is on the territories of the USA and many other countries of the world. The former system is within the territory of the USSR, whereas the latter is external to the USSR and is worldwide.

This distribution results in the better capability of the latter system to detect and identify underground explosions of interest. In addition ten arrays */ have been established for research purposes, some of which contribute data to international data centres.

(2) It was reported that the problems of detection using body waves by such networks as WWSSN and contributing arrays are less severe than those involved in identification. American and British participants reported that identification by the WWSSN network is possible for explosions in the Northern Hemisphere down to the level of 20 to 60 kilotons exploded in hard rock like granite. This progress has depended on the traditional seismological data exchange between countries.

(3) Both major systems mentioned in paragraph 1 are able to locate within 10 to 40 kilometers the site of explosions in the range of yields mentioned above.

(4) It was however recognized that for explosions in less dense materials, like Nevada tuff (a porous volcanic rock) and alluvium, the yield corresponding to the identification limit mentioned above would be increased two (tuff) to ten times (alluvium), depending in the latter case on the water content. The maximum possible yield in alluvium would be limited by the thickness of the alluvium layer, and by the possible requirement to prevent cratering. For example, if the layer is 450 meters thick, the maximum fully contained yield would be of the order of 20 kilotons.

(5) Another case of reduced signal strength is that of an explosion in a specially prepared underground cavity. Small scale experiments in the USA and UK have been made during the last few years, the largest of which was reported to be a nuclear explosion of 0.35 kilotons. All confirmed the theoretically predicted reduction of signal strength by a factor of about one hundred. It was recognized that there may be considerable practical limitations to do this with yields above 10 kilotons. Some participants expressed the opinion that large decoupled explosions might be detected by radioactive leakage, subsidence craters and by other means.

(6) Although the emergence of a method for positive identification of explosions has made the annual number of corresponding earthquakes less important than in the past, earthquake statistics are still pertinent to the problems associated with an

*/ An array is a complex of seismometers spread over a wide area and connected to a central point.

underground test ban. The worldwide yearly number of earthquakes corresponding to a 20 kiloton explosion in tuff, has been observed to be about 2000. The number corresponding to 2 ± 1 kilotons exploding in granite, was estimated to be somewhere between ten and twenty thousand. These observations and estimates are based on four years of observations, obtained from the data centre of the WWSSN. The Soviet data indicate that these numbers of earthquakes should be reduced by a factor of two. The large numbers of earthquakes at the lower yield equivalence would be expected to cause some problems of interference.

(7) The criterion providing the method of positively identifying explosions by seismological means alone employs the difference in the relative excitation of body and surface seismic waves between explosions and earthquakes. */ This technique requires that seismic waves from explosions are not masked by signals from other events.

(8) At the yields referred to above (20-60 kilotons in granite), the measurements of these seismic waves recorded by the WWSSN network give a clear separation of explosions and earthquakes. The existing experimental evidence on the usefulness of the surface wave method for identification of explosions with lower yields is as yet inconclusive. The long period instruments in the WWSSN are not sensitive enough to record the surface waves from low yield explosions at great distances. UK, Canadian, American and USSR research indicates separation of explosions and earthquakes down to 10 kilotons in hard rock. Studies at shorter distances are inconclusive as to the validity of this discriminant for yields below 10 kilotons in hard rock.

(9) The majority of the participants believe that other criteria, such as

Depth at which the event takes place,
Direction of the first ground motion at recording stations,
Frequency content of seismic waves,
Excitation of shear waves,
Complexity of the seismic record

*/ A surface wave is a wave of long period running along the surface of the Earth; a body wave is a short-period wave running through the deep interior of the Earth.

do not at present provide positive identification. However, ideas were presented on how such criteria could be combined, by standard statistical procedures, for more effective utilization of the data.

(10) Improvements in identification can be expected in the foreseeable future from application of current research results. Immediate improvement of existing networks could be obtained, for example by moving stations from disturbed to quiet locations or establishing satellite stations in certain cases. A similar example of a more costly improvement would be the installation of about thirty highly sensitive long period seismographs, of a kind only recently developed, at certain stations of the WWSSN network. It would lower the detection threshold for surface waves by a factor of about ten but the discriminant is at present unproved below 10 kilotons in hard rock.

In addition the implementation of more arrays would make it possible to conduct research into whether the identification of explosions in the 2-10 kT range in granite is possible, and would enable the design of suitable monitoring systems if the results so warrant.

(11) Implicit in the projections above are recommendations for network developments based on present research results.

(12) The group also saw that the following fields for research could be profitable:

(a) methods of improving surface wave detection

(b) more detailed work on the relative excitation of body and surface waves by earthquakes and explosions

(c) pattern recognition of seismic records

(d) statistical treatment of identification criteria for decision applications.

(13) The effectiveness of this programme of research, as well as progress in the efforts to lower the thresholds of detection and identification, would be greatly increased if existing networks could merge into one worldwide data exchange system.

L. Constantinescu
U. Ericsson
E. Herrin
V. Kárník
P. Mechler
S. Miyamura
I. Pasechnik
F. Press
H. Thirlaway
K. Whitham
T. Varghese

Tällberg, Sweden, June 28, 1968.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/231*
6 August 1968
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED KINGDOM

Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare

The United Kingdom Delegation consider that the 1925 Geneva Protocol is not an entirely satisfactory instrument for dealing with the question of chemical and microbiological warfare. The following points may be noted:

(i) Many states are not parties to the Protocol and of those that are parties many, including the United Kingdom, have reserved the right to use chemical and bacteriological weapons against non-parties, violators of the Protocol and their allies.

(ii) Jurists are not agreed whether the Protocol represents customary international law or whether it is of a purely contractual nature.

(iii) Even if all states were to accede to the Protocol there would still be a risk of large-scale use of the proscribed weapons as long as states have the right to manufacture such weapons and to use them against violators and their allies.

(iv) There is no consensus on the meaning of the term "gases" in the phrase "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices". The French version of the Protocol renders "or other" as "ou similaires" and the discrepancy between "other" and "similaires" has led to disagreement on whether non-lethal gases are covered by the Protocol.

(v) The term "bacteriological" as used in the Protocol is not sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole range of microbiological agents that might be used in hostilities.

(vi) The prohibition in the Protocol applies to use "in war". There may therefore be doubt about its applicability in the case of hostilities which do not amount to war in its technical sense.

---

*For technical reasons this document is reissued and replaces ENDC/231

2. It is not to be expected that all these difficulties can be easily or speedily resolved. The United Kingdom Delegation suggest, however, that the problem might be made less intractable by considering chemical and microbiological methods of warfare separately. The Geneva Protocol puts them on an identical basis, but -

(i) As indicated in paragraph 1 (iv) above, there is disagreement on whether the ban covers all agents or only lethal ones. It would be extremely difficult to secure agreement on a new instrument banning the use of all agents of chemical warfare, particularly as some of those agents have legitimate peaceful uses for such purposes as riot control.

(ii) Chemical weapons have been used on a large scale in war in the past and are regarded by some states as a weapon they must be prepared to use if necessary in any future war, particularly as they fear they may be used against them. In any event, at the moment, they would be reluctant to give up the manufacture of chemical agents and the right to conduct research, etc., in this field.

3. The United Kingdom Delegation recognize that verification, in the sense in which the term is normally used in disarmament negotiations, is not possible in either the chemical or the microbiological field. The difficulty, as far as the microbiological field is concerned, is that the organisms which would be used are required for medical and veterinary uses and could be produced quickly, cheaply and without special facilities either in established laboratories or in makeshift facilities. As far as chemical agents are concerned it seems unlikely that states will be prepared to forego the right to produce and stockpile such agents for possible use in war unless adequate verification procedures can be devised and applied and problems of definition etc. resolved. However, the use of microbiological methods of warfare has never been established, and these are generally regarded with even greater abhorrence than chemical methods. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore consider that in this field the choice lies between going ahead with the formulation of new obligations and doing nothing at all - in which case the risks and the fears of eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare will continue and intensify indefinitely.

4. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore propose the early conclusion of a new Convention for the Prohibition of Microbiological Methods of Warfare, which would supplement but not supersede the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This Convention would

proscribe the use for hostile purposes of microbiological agents causing death or disease by infection in man, other animals, or crops. Under it states would:-

(i) declare their belief that the use of microbiological methods of warfare of any kind and in any circumstances should be treated as contrary to international law and a crime against humanity;

(ii) undertake never to engage in such methods of warfare themselves in any circumstances.

5. The Convention should also include a ban on the production of microbiological agents which was so worded as to take account of the fact that most of the microbiological agents that could be used in hostilities are also needed for peaceful purposes. Thus the ban might be on the production of microbiological agents on a scale which had no independent peaceful justification. Alternatively, the Convention might ban the production of microbiological agents for hostile purposes, or it might ban their production in quantities that would be incompatible with the obligation never to engage in microbiological methods of warfare in any circumstances.

6. Whatever the formulation might be, the ban would also need to cover ancillary equipment specifically designed to facilitate the use of microbiological agents in hostilities. In addition, the Convention would of course need to include an undertaking to destroy, within a short period after the Convention comes into force, any stocks of such microbiological agents or ancillary equipment which are already in the possession of the parties.

7. The Convention would also needto deal with research work. It should impose a ban on research work aimed at production of the kind prohibited above, as regards both microbiological agents and ancillary equipment. It should also provide for the appropriate civil medical or health authorities to have access to all research work which might give rise to allegations that the obligations imposed by the Convention were not being fulfilled. Such research work should be open to international investigation if so required and should also be open to public scrutiny to the maximum extent compatible with national security and the protection of industrial and commercial processes.

8. In the knowledge that strict processes of verification are not possible, it is suggested that consideration might be given inter alia to the possibility that a competent body of experts, established under the auspices of the United Nations, might investigate allegations made by a party to the Convention which appeared to establish a prima facie case that another party had acted in breach of the

obligations established in the Convention. The Convention would contain a provision by which parties would undertake to co-operate fully in any investigation and any failure to comply with this or any of the other obligations imposed by the Convention would be reported to the Security Council.

9. As regards entry into force of the Convention, the appropriate international body might be invited to draw up a list of states (say 10-12) that it considers most advanced in microbiological research work. The Convention might come into force when ratified by all those states and a suitably large number of other states.

10. Consideration should be given to the possibility of including in the Convention an article under which the parties would undertake to support appropriate action in accordance with the United Nations Charter to counter the use, or threatened use, of microbiological methods of warfare. If such an article were included it might be endorsed by the Security Council in rather the same way as the Council welcomed and endorsed the declarations made by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in connexion with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

ENDC/232
20 August 1968
Original: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

UNITED KINGDOM

Working Paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The United Kingdom Delegation consider that priority in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament should be given to a ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons; in their view the real danger of vertical proliferation lies in the development of more sophisticated weapons systems which a comprehensive test ban treaty would prevent. The United Kingdom Delegation favour the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty at the earliest possible moment and as soon as terms that are generally acceptable can be agreed.

2. The principal avowed obstacle in the way of a comprehensive test ban treaty is the problem of on-site inspection. It may be noted, however, that since the early days of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, the means of identifying incidents as earthquakes or explosions have been greatly improved and there is substantial agreement at the technical level on what can or cannot be identified. This is evidenced in the unanimously adopted summary of the report of the recent meetings of scientists and other experts to discuss the technical aspects of the control of an underground test ban under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm (ENDC/230).

3. The United Kingdom Delegation understand fears that on-site inspection might present difficulties but recognise that below the identification threshold there can be no certainty whether a given event is an explosion or an earthquake. In these circumstances it is reasonable for parties to a comprehensive test ban treaty to ask for such verification to be provided as is possible, practicable and necessary to ensure that other parties are honouring their obligations. In order to dispel the fears of those who maintain that on-site inspection would present difficulties and to meet the needs of those who maintain that the possibility of on-site inspection is vital for the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban treaty, the United Kingdom

Delegation suggest that consideration should be given to the establishment under such a treaty of a committee whose function it would be to consider evidence of possible infringement of the treaty. Such a committee would have the right to carry out on-site inspection but only if strong evidence were produced of an infringement of the treaty.

4. The United Kingdom Delegation's views on the composition of the committee are flexible. They seek first to gain acceptance of the principle of its establishment. But they suggest that it might be composed of representatives of the three nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty, representatives of three non-aligned countries, and a nominee of the United Nations Secretary-General or the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is suggested that apart from the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency nominee the members of the committee might be government representatives, assisted by scientific advisers, rather than themselves scientists. The right of on-site inspection would only be exercised if the committee agreed by a majority of 5-2 that a prima facie case had been made out. While the committee would have the ultimate right of on-site inspection, the procedure proposed is specifically designed to circumscribe this right in such a way as to ensure that it was not exercised irresponsibly or improperly.

5. As scientific knowledge and the means of detection and identification develop, the need for and the probability of on-site inspection would diminish. No country adhering to the treaty would be submitting to any certain or automatic on-site inspection. But the possibility that inspection might take place would play a very large part in establishing confidence in the effectiveness of the treaty.

6. While the United Kingdom Delegation are in favour of the conclusion of an effective test ban treaty at the earliest possible moment they have also been considering the possibility that the implementation of the comprehensive test ban might be made a phased operation by starting with an agreed annual quota of underground test explosions. This proposal is based on recognition of the fact that it may not be possible to get agreement now to stop all nuclear weapons testing over night in isolation from other measures of disarmament. The object of the quota proposal is to put an increasingly powerful brake on the development of new nuclear weapon systems with a view to bringing this dangerous process to a complete halt

within a fixed time period. The treaty might provide for quotas on a descending scale over a period of four or five years ending with a nil quota after which further tests would be banned absolutely. Alternatively, the quotas might not be written into the treaty but fixed annually, possibly by a committee of the kind which has been suggested above. Supervision of the quota arrangements would be exercised by the same mechanism as proposed above for the treaty itself.

7. It will also be necessary under a comprehensive test ban treaty to provide for the carrying out of operational or experimental nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The United Kingdom Delegation consider that such a requirement could be accommodated within the system proposed. There may well be a need for international supervision of peaceful nuclear explosions, in order to satisfy states party to the treaty and the international committee that the explosion in question was needed for its stated purpose. Peaceful nuclear explosions could also be accommodated within a quota system, either by treating them as part of the quota or as permitted exclusions from the treaty provided they conformed to internationally agreed arrangements for their conduct.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/234
23 August 1968
Original: FRENCH

I T A L Y

WORKING PAPER ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

1. The Italian Government has long advocated the possibility of extending the 1963 Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests to underground nuclear explosions.

The recent conclusion of negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the undertakings stipulated in Article VI, as well as in the preamble, make it possible to hope that definite progress will be made very quickly in this field, which is so important for world peace and security.

From the development of the discussions during the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament it appears that an overall and complete solution of this problem still presents difficulties which have not been eliminated. Consequently, the Italian Government feels that every possible effort should be made to achieve at least some partial progress, while waiting until events have matured and enable all the remaining obstacles to be overcome.

2. With this in view, and with the object to obtaining some partial results, the Italian delegation suggests that the regulation of underground explosions for peaceful purposes should for the time being be separated from that of underground nuclear explosions for military purposes.

This separation would have the advantage of making it possible to leave military explosions aside provisionally and to endeavour to reach agreement on an acceptable form of control where nuclear explosions of a peaceful nature are concerned. The problem would thus be simplified because by tackling it in this way a temporary solution would be possible, until scientific and technical progress succeeded in providing appropriate ways and means for guaranteeing an overall prohibition of tests, beyond all possibility of dispute.

3. Within the framework of an international system for the regulation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the following preliminary initiatives could be envisaged:

(a) Governments responsible for underground nuclear explosions should act in a different manner according to whether underground nuclear explosions for peaceful or for military purposes are concerned. The former, before being carried out, should be announced to the United Nations, with all necessary details (approximate date of the test, locality, depth, purpose, power of explosive). All explosions which had not been announced to the United Nations in this way would be regarded as being of a military nature.

(b) These same Governments should invite foreign experts (scientists and technicians) chosen and approved by them from non-nuclear States to observe the explosions. In this way, the experts of the non-nuclear States would be able to familiarize themselves with the techniques of nuclear explosions, and especially with their practical results. A start would thus be made to apply the provisions of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(c) Non-nuclear Governments, in their turn, should submit a list of experts to the Governments of the States where the nuclear explosions are to take place; the observers invited to participate in the nuclear tests would be selected from among the names given in this list.

4. The proposal submitted by the Italian delegation, if accepted, would make it possible to obtain the following results:

(a) The scope of the field not yet covered by the regulations of the 1963 Treaty would be reduced.

(b) A start could be made to apply the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in particular Articles V and VI, as well as paragraph 11 of its preamble.

(c) The result would be achieved that a certain number of scientists and technicians from non-nuclear States would acquire knowledge or deepen their existing knowledge of the benefits that can be derived from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

(d) There would be created a more favourable situation for tackling, in due course, the problem of underground nuclear explosions for military purposes with reasonable prospects of success.

5. Lastly, the Italian Government is of the opinion that, in the light of recent developments in the international field, it would be desirable to consider, at the same time as the measures set forth above, the advisability of deciding upon and proclaiming the prohibition of all explosions under the sea-bed of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices for military purposes.

Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the sea-bed could at present be the subject of a general moratorium until they are regulated on an international basis requiring detailed studies to guarantee the necessary safety measures for the protection of the interests of nations in the sea-bed and ocean floor environments.

6. The Italian delegation wishes to make it clear that the proposals which it has submitted are aimed essentially at the adoption of provisional measures which would represent a limited advance while waiting for the possibility of reaching an overall agreement for the cessation of all experiments for military purposes.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/235
26 August 1968
Original: ENGLISH

BRAZIL, BURMA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic continue to view with deep concern that it has not so far been possible to reach agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They had expressed their apprehensions and anxieties in this regard in their earlier joint memoranda (ENDC/159 and ENDC/177).

Ever since 1959, when the General Assembly of the United Nations became seized of this question, it has adopted Resolutions each year on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

In its latest Resolution on the subject, 2343 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, the General Assembly has urged all States which have not so far adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to do so without further delay, and has called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and has expressed the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data. Finally, the resolution has requested the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session.

In the Preamble of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 the three nuclear-weapon powers parties to the Treaty had expressed their determination "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

It is a matter of utmost regret that despite the General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVI), which had condemned all nuclear weapon tests, and the Partial Test Ban Treaty, nuclear weapon tests have not been suspended but are continuing both in atmosphere and underground.

The eight delegations are gravely concerned by the fact that all countries have not yet adhered to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Tests in the atmosphere are, in fact, taking place at an increasing rate and the yields of such tests have reached the megaton range, resulting once again in widespread radioactive contamination, which had started diminishing since the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

Nuclear weapon testing underground is also continuing at a high frequency and with increasing yields, thus substantiating the fears expressed in the Memorandum of the eight delegations of August 17, 1966, that continued testing would impart "a renewed impetus to the arms race, bringing about unforeseeable consequences in regard to imbalance and mistrust in the relationship between States and causing immense and increasing diversion of human and material resources for purposes of war."

There have also been reports that large underground tests have led to leakages of radioactivity outside the territorial limits of testing States, thus causing infringements of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Even if these incidents have not been deliberate, they may eventually lead to a weakening of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and even endanger its very existence.

The heavy costs involved in nuclear weapon testing and the continued drain on highly specialized personnel being used for the further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons are a matter of serious concern for the international community. Considerable economic and technical resources and personnel could be redirected to peaceful scientific efforts and co-operation in the peaceful nuclear field if a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were concluded.

The eight delegations reaffirm their strong view that a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon-tests would be an important step in the field of disarmament and would constitute an earnest of the intention of the nuclear-weapon Powers to carry out their obligations in accordance with the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

The eight delegations are aware that the differences among the nuclear-weapon Powers on the question of verification and the type of system needed for monitoring a treaty banning underground tests have not yet been resolved in spite of the fact that there has been considerable progress in regard to methods of control of an underground test ban.

The eight delegations note that various proposals have been put forward in the Committee by several delegations. They view with deep apprehension the fact that no serious negotiations have taken place on these proposals. These proposals should be studied further without delay.

Further international discussion could be held to promote an organized international exchange of seismic data from national seismological stations. Such an exchange would help to provide a better scientific basis for national evaluation of underground events.

An encouraging development has been that experts from various countries including four nuclear-weapon States have recently had an unofficial meeting in order to exchange views and hold discussions in regard to the adequacy of such methods. It is the view of the eight delegations that such discussions are useful and should continue.

In the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in connexion with discussions on it the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has been given considerable prominence. This question is, however, also closely linked with a comprehensive test ban. This aspect of the matter underlines the urgency of a universal and comprehensive solution of the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the context of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The eight delegations strongly urge that renewed and urgent efforts be made to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the eight delegations reaffirm their strong and consistent view that the nuclear-weapon States should take immediate steps for the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests.

Geneva, August 26, 1968

ANNEX II

CHECK-LIST OF DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE

(16 July 1968 - 28 August 1968)

Part A - Verbatim records of the Conference [ENDC/PV.-series]

	Date	Symbol
381st meeting to 394th meeting	16 July 1968 to 28 August 1968	ENDC/PV.381 to ENDC/PV.394

* * *

Part B - Documents of the Conference [ENDC/- series]

Title of document	Date	Symbol
Letter dated 11 January 1968 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairman of the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmamont transmitting Resolutions 2286 (XXII), 2289 (XXII), 2342 (XXII), 2343 (XXII), 2344 (XXII), and 2346 (XXII) of the General Assembly.	18 January 1968	ENDC/210
Letter dated 20 June 1968 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmitting Resolution 2373 (XXII) of the General Assembly and Resolution S/RES/255 of the Security Council.	16 July 1968	ENDC/226
Memorandum by the Government of the USSR on some urgent measures for stopping the Arms race and for disarmament	16 July 1968	ENDC/227
United States of America - Message of President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	16 July 1968	ENDC/228

Title of document	Date	Symbol
United Kingdom - Message to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, The Right Honourable Harold Wilson, M.P.	16 July 1968	ENDC/229
Sweden - Letter dated 29 July 1968 from the Representative of Sweden to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	29 July 1968	ENDC/230
United Kingdom - Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare	6 August 1968	ENDC/231
United Kingdom - Working Paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	20 August 1968	ENDC/232
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Letter dated 20 August 1968 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	20 August 1968	ENDC/233
Italy - Working Paper on Underground nuclear explosions	23 August 1968	ENDC/234
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic - Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	26 August 1968	ENDC/235

Part C - Documents containing information of an administrative nature [ENDC/INF.-Series]

Title of Document	Date	Symbol
Basic Information for Delegations on Conference Arrangements and Documentation	16 July 1968	ENDC/INF.1/ Rev.13 w/Corr.1
List of Members of Delegations to the Conference	18 July 1968	ENDC/INF.2/ Rev.36 w/Add.1